The Task for Social Philosophy
My preferred way of engaging with books is reconstruction. These notes were created during my reading process to aid my own understanding and not written for the purpose of instruction. With that said, I’ve decided to share these unedited notes on the off chance they are helpful to other readers.
We can best understand Horkheimer’s conception of critical theory by contrasting it in its assumptions, purpose, means, and form to traditional theory.
The first difference in assumption is that traditional theory conceives of knowledge as independent while critical theory conceives of knowledge as embodied. Traditional theory views knowledge, the knower, and the pursuit of knowledge as independent from all other social processes “as though it were grounded in the inner nature of knowledge as such or justified in some other ahistorical way” (Horkheimer 194). The critical theorist, on the other hand, assumes that knowledge and, more importantly, the criteria for knowledge “do not derive from purely logical or methodological sources but can rather be understood only in the context of real social processes” (Horkheimer 194). Even if individual scientists pursue knowledge for reasons internal to knowledge, its acceptance is always dependent upon historicity. The Copernican theory was not accepted in the 17th century for its logical properties alone, or else it would have been favored already in the 16th century when these exact qualities were already present. In this case, the effects of the newfound epistemic affinity for mechanistic thinking can not be overlooked. Or even more apparently, the practical results of theoretical thinking are applied and validated in industry. Knowledge effects society as much as society effects knowledge. As a result, the object of interest for the critical theorist must be the “definite individual in his real relation to other individuals and groups, in his conflict with a particular class, and, finally, in the resultant web of relationships with the social totality and with nature” that is to say an individual as formed by his constituent social and natural realities (Horkheimer 211). The object of interest of the traditional theorist is always independent and discrete elements: atoms, compounds, individuals.
Because of the traditional theorist’s assumption of society as independent from knowledge and action disjoint from thought, “which finds expression in philosophical terminology as the separation of value and research, knowledge and action”, they are freed from making anymore assumptions about reality (Horkheimer 208). It is an assumption to relieve oneself of the obligation for more assumptions. But Horkheimer will soon show that this faux-liberalism only leads to compliancy.
The second assumption that critical theory makes is that society is irrational. Historically, the world was irrational in two ways, from the forces untamed by humanity or what he called “nature” and by the oppressive forces between humans. Currently however, the cause of all suffering cannot be blamed on the former for we have mastered productive techniques so effective that, if only the latter did not exist, we would be able to achieve emancipation. On the individual scale, it might appear that we are individual, independent actors with unlimited freedom, but as a whole these individual choices create a force of their own ”that world is not [our] own but the world of capital” (Horkheimer 221). This world, which Horkheimer describes as inhuman because it can not reasonably be understood as the result of human intention, then shapes our individual actions in imperceptible ways, giving us the illusion of freedom. “Previous history thus cannot really be understood; only the individuals and specific groups in it are intelligible, and even these not totally, since their internal dependence on an inhuman society means that even in their conscious action such individuals and groups are still in good measure mechanical functions” (Horkheimer 208).
The third assumption that critical theory makes is freedom. This assumption is fully fleshed out when comparing how the two different theories consider necessity. In traditional theory the necessity postulated is an objective necessity independent of the subject: a falling object responds to gravity in a necessarily predictable manner regardless of subjective action. In the sociological sphere, this conception of necessity, if taken seriously, transforms into “a faith in the unchangeableness of the social structure it dominates the present. Reflecting on themselves men see themselves only as on-lookers, passive participants in a mighty process which may be foreseen but not modified” (Horkheimer 231). What underlies this fatalistic conclusion is the Cartesian dualism of thought and being, or in terms we are already familiar with: knowledge as independent. Because of this independence, traditional theory undervalues the causal power of thought and resigns in actual practice, viewing the world as a deterministic system that they can have no hope in changing. Critical theory conceives of necessity in a much more interdependent manner. Critical theory (thought) argues for a necessary historical evolution through the conflict of human interests (being) which necessarily then gives birth to a theory which critiques current conditions (thought). Critical theory describes a world in which both its own existence and its predictions are necessary. What is animating this circular dependency is an assumption of freedom. “The concept of necessity in the critical theory is itself a critical concept; it presupposes freedom, even if a not yet existent freedom. But the idea of freedom as a purely interior reality which is always there even when men are enslaved is typical of the idealist mentality” (Horkheimer 230). In other words, critical theorists assume that a fundamental drive, if not the fundamental drive of mankind is a persistent drive for freedom. This assumption is what makes the historical predictions of critical theory a necessity.
The purpose of traditional theory is hidden from itself. Theoreticians conceives of themselves as independent actors but, in reality, they are part of the societal division of labor and therefore are a cog in the whole production process. The purpose of traditional theory, unbeknownst to itself, is to accelerate the capitalistic process, to actualize the values of current society. Critical theory on the other hand, because of its assumptions that knowledge is embodied, that society is irrational, and that humans will inevitably pursue freedom “is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable, as these are understood in the present order“ (Horkheimer 207). The purpose of critical theory is to resolve the contradictions between its second and third assumption by pursuing human emancipation. Its purpose is not to rectify any specific injustice within society but to alter the societal structure altogether. Horkheimer claims it is to have “missionary functions”, a metaphor that is deeply illuminating. Much like religious conversion, critical theory aims at not merely actualizing apparent worldly values but bringing about more transcendental ones. In addition, much like a missionary’s tactics, the critical theorist is deeply embedded and engaged with society.
The means by which traditional theory actualizes its hidden purpose is also abstracted away and collapsed into the societal prestige awarded to the theoretician: “science need not trouble itself because their fulfillment [of their role in production] is rewarded and confirmed by the social position of the scientist” (Horkheimer 216). Because of its polemic tensions with current society, critical theory does not have as expedient means as its traditional counterpart. In fact, a methodological issue arises immediately. Prima facie, it seems that critical theory is forced to commit the mistake of idealist philosophy and look within thinking itself for stepwise direction or to resort to empty Utopian fantasy; either way it seems that critical theory would be divorced from reality. To mitigate this disaster, Horkheimer first concedes that throughout history “the full measure of goods produced for man's enjoyment has, at any particular stage, been given directly only to a small group of men“ but at the same time “”the desire to bring the same enjoyment to the majority has stirred in the depths of men's hearts” (Horkheimer 212). We can see three processes within work: the first is the conquest of nature; the second is a desire for power which results in inequality; the last is a drive for justice. Traditional theory, by virtue of its correspondence with the ruling class, accelerates the first two and by virtue of its contributions to the first, is very much necessary. The role of critical theory is to actualize this last process within work. Thus the methodological dilemma is resolved, critical theory is neither conjuring up a fantasy nor resorting to empty formalism but rather assisting and actualizing a potent but mostly dormant reality: “Thought does not spin such a possibility out of itself but rather becomes aware of its own proper function. In the course of history men have come to know their own activity and thus to recognize the contradiction that marks their existence” (Horkheimer 212). There are two charitable interpretations to how justice could be a telos of work. The first is that in the process of production, humans have a desire to share their products in a just manner, a desire that if ignored renders the work process incomplete in some fundamental way. The second is that the process of production actually only leads to injustice but by building up the tensions within society for revolution, it increases the potential for justice. While the metrics for success for the traditional theorist is clear, progress for the critical theorist is hard to interpret, unstable, and its early stages might even be worse off than the original state. As a result, the critical theorist has to be obstinate in their means.
Lastly, the form of traditional theory is abstract, atemporal, and valueless while the form of critical theory is causal, historical, and emancipatory. Traditional theory begins with the most abstract of “universal concepts under which all facts in the field in question are to be subsumed” (Horkheimer 224). The relationship between theory and concrete reality is one between generalizations and specific instances e.g. a wolf is an instance of wolf the abstract concept. This relationship is not causal or temporal and at least claims to be valueless. Critical theory on the other hand also starts with an abstraction, in the case of Marx: the commodity structure. But the relationship of this abstraction to concrete reality isn’t one of instances and abstractions as is the case in traditional theory. The fetishization of a commodity was not a particular instance of the commodity structure. Instead the relationship is causal: “The relation of the primary conceptual interconnections to the world of facts is not essentially a relation of classes to instances. It is because of its inner dynamism that the exchange relationship, which the theory outlines, dominates social reality” (Horkheimer 225). The move from abstraction to concreteness “is not accomplished by simple deduction as in theory that has been simplified for special use” instead “more specific elements must be introduced in order to move from fundamental structure to concrete reality”, “every step rests on knowledge of man and nature which is stored up in the sciences and in historical experience” (Horkheimer 227). Essentially, critical theory provides a starting central figure and then provides a causal explanation of this figures importance throughout history and in the future. It is inherently temporal, “guided by concern for the future, of the historical process” (Horkheimer 227). It is “the unfolding of a single existential judgment“ and is therefore inherently emancipatory in nature and not valueless (Horkheimer 227).
In my analysis, I have argued that, in Horkheimer’s conception, critical theory diverges from traditional theory in the following ways. The latter assumes that knowledge creation is independent from other societal mechanisms while the former considers it to be embodied and necessarily dependent. The former believes society to be irrational and human nature to be freedom-seeking while the latter relieves itself from having to deal with these problems due to its primary assumption. The purpose of the latter is ambiguous to itself but in reality is serves to perpetuate the existing order in gaining control over nature and society. The purpose of the former is explicit and directed at human emancipation. The latter proceeds by societal rewards while the former proceeds in constant tension with society, possibly even with the class it seeks to emancipate. The structure of the latter is abstract, atemporal, and valueless while the structure of the former is causal, historical, and emancipatory.