Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith | Notes & Summary
Summary
Smith’s work can be read as a discussion of the economic, social and moral consequences of sympathy — our capacity to imagine ourselves in the shoes of an other and to feel what he feels.
Economically, sympathy renders the pursuit of private vice into public virtue. Since, despite our selfishness, our sympathetic drives collapse other-interest into self-interest. Sympathy does the heavy work behind both the invisible hand and trickle-down economics.
Socially, we crave to be sympathized with it is our source of joy and reconciliation for sadness yet not all passions are equally easy to sympathize with. Thus we conform because we want to only display that which is easily sympathizable. The fact that joy is easier to sympathize with than grief grants us ambition and an urge to display our wealth and greatness. This becomes a form of social moral collapse because it is easier to sympathize with wealth than with virtue.
Morally, we approve of other’s actions if we sympathize with him. But we want to be fair so instead we make moral judgements by asking whether a fair and impartial spectator would sympathize with an action. The impartial spectator is important because 1. Shows people want to be objectively good not just subjectively 2. Rare moral theory based off sentiments 3. Strong drive towards universalizability 4. This is a descriptive theory but since Smith believe God made us inherently moral, it is also normative.
Normatively, he proposes that we become happy (by being sympathized with and worthy of said sympathy) not through prestige but rather virtue: prudence, justice, beneficence.
Economic Consequences of Sympathy
He begins the book "however selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it." The way we think about others is through sympathy. Unlike empathy which is feeling what the other feels, sympathy is feeling what we would feel if we were in their shoes. To sympathize is to imagine ourselves in their shoes and feeling the same way in their situation.
He says that human’s ability to make moral capacities are severely limited to a tight sphere (which makes sense if it is ultimately sympathy that helps us make these decisions). This is also fundamentally centered around our self interests but tamed by the fact that we want to be honorable and want not to be dishonorable, sympathy for others also collapse into self-interest:
The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.”
Note that in this one quote Smith introduces two concepts: trickle down economics which is predicated on the fact that the rich don’t consume a lot and end up distributing their goods, and the invisible hand. Both of these are crucial for laissez-faire economics. It also relies on these closely knit economies where sympathy can kick in.
Social Consequences of Sympathy
But sympathy isn’t merely a faculty we use, we also crave to be sympathized with (what smith coins Mutual Sympathy) “nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary.” He thinks this is due to a fundamental weakness and an acknowledgement that we need the assistance of others. We are more anxious to communicate disagreeable passions like hate more than agreeable passions than love. But we derive more satisfaction from sympathy of the former. When you share something good the lack of sympathy can make it a bad experience but if you share something bad and you get sympathy then it can make it a desirable experience. Mutual sympathy is one of the chief aims of our lives and also one of our most significant sources of happiness. It is also our biggest source of condolence: “To see the emotions of their hearts, in every respect, beat time to his own, in the violent and disagreeable passions, constitutes his sole consolation.” This theory, with its primacy on sympathy explains why the alienation that Marx brought about was so disturbing: it robs us of our ability to sympathize.
But not all passions are equally sympathizable. Smith thinks that the urge to be sympathized with is the mechanism of conformity, because we learn to broadcast and hide certain passions. ie. We tailor the passions we display by how much we think others would sympathize. If we were to rank what emotions we deem decent and indecent we would find that they correlate exactly to how disposed mankind is to sympathize with them. Bodily passions of sexual excitement, pain, hunger are not sympathizable in general and indecent. “The little sympathy which we feel with bodily pain is the foundation of the propriety of constancy and patience in enduring it.” We tune down our unsocial hateful passions because there is a subset of people (namely the hated) who do not sympathize. We emphasize our social loving passions because everyone (giver and receiver ) can sympathize. In our selfish passions of grief and joy, large griefs are easier to sympathize with than small griefs, but joy is much easier to sympathize than grief in general “Why should we be more ashamed to rep than to laugh before company? We always feel that the spectators are more likely to go along with us in the agreeable, than in the painful emotion.”
The fact that joy is much easier to sympathize with than grief and the fact we want sympathy — for others to feel what we are feeling — is why we are ambitious. We desire to gain the knowledge, wealth, greatness and publicly announce them so others would involuntarily sympathize with us:
It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us. But vanity is always founded upon the belief of our being the object of attention and approbation. The rich man glories in his riches because he feels that they naturally draw upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind are disposed to go along with him in all those agreeable emotions with which the advantages of his situation so readily inspire him.
On the converse, it hurts more to be contempt and looked down upon (not sympathized with) than to actually go through calamity. That is why “It is often more mortifying to appear in public under small disasters, than under great misfortunes. The first excite no sympathy; but the second, though they may excite none that approach to the anguish of the sufferer, call forth, however, a very lively compassion…. Compared with the contempt of mankind, all other external evils are easily supported.”
However, the fact that wealth and greatness is easier to sympathize with than wisdom and virtue is one of the biggest problems corrupting morality in society. This is Adam Smith’s way of saying that the niceties of the latter take a much keener eye to discern:
We desire both to be respectable and to be respected (sympathizable). We dread both to be contemptible and to be contemned (not sympathizable). But, upon coming into the world, we soon find that wisdom and virtue are by no means the sole objects of respect; nor vice and folly, of contempt. We frequently see the respectful attentions of the world more strongly directed towards the rich and the great, than towards the wise and the virtuous. We see frequently the vices and follies of the powerful much less despised than the poverty and weakness of the innocent. To deserve, to acquire, and to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind, are the great objects of ambition and emulation. Two different roads are presented to us, equally leading to the attainment of this so much desired object; the one, by the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue; the other, by the acquisition of wealth and greatness. Two different characters are presented to our emulation; the one, of proud ambition and ostentatious avidity. the other, of humble modesty and equitable justice. Two different models, two different pictures, are held out to us, according to which we may fashion our own character and behaviour; the one more gaudy and glittering in its colouring; the other more correct and more exquisitely beautiful in its outline: the one forcing itself upon the notice of every wandering eye; the other, attracting the attention of scarce any body but the most studious and careful observer. They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly, a select, though, I am afraid, but a small party, who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, and, what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers, of wealth and greatness.
He does not, however, believe that vanity is useless, because it is such a driving force of society. He does not give it any label of good or bad, but merely recognizes and accepts it as a fact of human nature. (Believing in God would have the Hegelian effect of reconciling us with the present, Smith's belief in God and order enables him to view and accept all aspects of society descriptively. It gives him freedom to accept things that are seemingly bad and see their utility -- God created them for a reason after all.) Instead he thinks great education and culture directs vanity to objects worthy of praise:
The desire of the esteem and admiration of other people, when for qualities and talents which are the natural and proper objects of esteem and admiration, is the real love of true glory; a passion which, if not the very best passion of human nature, is certainly one of the best … The great secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects. Never suffer him to value himself upon trivial accomplishments. But do not always discourage his pretensions to those that are of real importance.
Moral Consequences of Sympathy
Sympathy is the way we make moral judgements. This is both a descriptive and normative view of ethics and its a rare set of ethics that is based on sentiments.
We give mere approval of the actions of another by sympathizing with him. That is to say, we approve of his sentiments/actions if we imagine doing the same in his shoes. (Interesting point here, if you don’t believe in free will, then “in his shoes” would mean his biology and upbringing, which is why the lack of belief in free will can make us more compassionate, in Smith’s theory we would always approve!)
We make actual moral judgements by considering one’s actions, especially our own, through the lens of an impartial spectator. An impartial spectator is fair and impartial to the problem at stake. He is an imagined form of a highly moral but totally abstract human. If he sympathizes with an action then we deem it worthy, otherwise contemptible.
This is also how we make sure we are moral. Because “man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely … he naturally dreads, not only to be hated, but to be hateful … he desires, not only praise, but praise-worthiness … he dreads, not only blame, but blame-worthiness.”
The impartial spectator is significant because it shows how people want to be objectively good, it is a rare moral theory based off of sentiment, there is. still a drive to obtain universalizability and impartiality that is echoed by the likes of Kant.
Smith also believes that God designed the world harmoniously like a clock. Thus Man is inherently moral. That is why his descriptive theory of reality is also a normative theory. Normatively, he merely warns us of the problems like the upper class and wealth that may lead us astray.
QUESTION: is the impartial spectator one person? How do we create impartial spectator? Does Smith realize the limits of this spectator? Is it the moral agent within us? Is it something divine? Smith attributes a greater quality of real impartial judgement to God?
ANSWER: Some people think it is a unbiased spectator that can transcend all cultures, which would make it a lot more Kantian. But smith himself says that this impartial spectator absorbs cultural biases, so it is much more of a tool for preventing personal bias.
Due to his belief in God, Smith believes we should aim to change our station in life, but if we try very hard and nothing happens we should take it as a sign from God that we are where we are meant to be.
The Good Life
Smith does not endorse ambition at all because he recognizes its utility. He recognizes that private vice CAN lead to public virtue but this is not an endorsement of the former. He actively talks about the futility of wealth and greatness, how we do it for others and not ourselves.
Smith's good life can be read as centered around happiness through virtue.
The formula of happiness for Smith is to be admired (sympathized with positively) and to actually be worthy of admiration (worthy of that sympathy). To be loved and to be lovely; to be praised and to be praiseworthy.
We arrive at the former through propriety (conformity), knowing what to say, when to say it, what to reveal, what to hide. We arrive at the latter if we believe an impartial spectator would approve of our actions. This is important because through sympathy, Smith is a rare advocate for conformity, at least in certain functions in life.
But there are many routes to admiration. He believes that through quiet virtue is the best route. His big three virtues are prudence: taking care of oneself, justice: not hurting others, and beneficence: being good to others.
Prudence is a combination of agency, industriousness, and humility:
The prudent man always studies seriously and earnestly to understand whatever he professes to understand, and not merely to persuade other people that he understands it; and though his talents may not always be very brilliant, they are always perfectly genuine.
…
He neither endeavours to impose upon you by the cunning devices of an artful impostor, nor by the arrogant airs of an assuming pedant, nor by the confident assertions of a superficial and imprudent pretender. He is not ostentatious even of the abilities which he really possesses. His conversation is simple and modest, and he is averse to all the quackish arts by which other people so frequently thrust themselves into public notice and reputation.
Justice is the approval from our impartial spectator which can “humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to something which other men can go along with”:
To disturb his happiness merely because it stands in the way of our own, to take from him what is of real use to him merely because it may be of equal or of more use to us, or to indulge, in this manner, at the expence of other people, the natural preference which every man has for his own happiness above that of other people, is what no impartial spectator can go along with.
…
In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle [jostle, bump into], or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of. This man is to them, in every respect, as good as he: they do not enter into that self-love by which he prefers himself so much to this other, and cannot go along with the motive from which he hurt him. They readily, therefore, sympathize with the natural resentment of the injured, and the offender becomes the object of their hatred and indignation.
Beneficence combines gratitude and charity.
Virtues however, except for justice, are rarely black and white. They cannot be laid out with rules. They must be developed like a good composition:
But there are no rules whose observance will infallibly lead us to the attainment of elegance or sublimity in writing; though there are some which may help us, in some measure, to correct and ascertain the vague ideas which we might otherwise have entertained of those perfections. And there are no rules by the knowledge of which we can infallibly be taught to act upon all occasions with prudence, with just magnanimity, or proper beneficence: though there are some which may enable us to correct and ascertain, in several respects, the imperfect ideas which we might otherwise have entertained of those virtues.
The Impartial(?) Spectator
Smith says how much our sympathy is distorted. It is predisposed to tragedies and joys of the imagination. The loss of a limb is a harder loss than that of a mistress but nothing was ever written about the former, simply because sympathy is a faculty of the imagination and holds onto qualities given to it by imagination. Fortune should have no effect and we should judge people for their intentions but we don't. Status is also highly correlated, as mentioned.
Surprisingly, Smith says that our supposed "impartial" spectator is just as effected by these distortions as we are. Yet smith says that it has positives: by being judged by our achievements and not just intentions, it forces us to be motivated to do; by being judged on our status, it makes people ambitious.
Anti-Utopianism
One of the first philosophers I've read who is anti-utopia. He does not believe in visionaries or man of the system. This is someone who has a particular vision for the world and stubbornly forces it into existence rather than letting it emerge through the choices of all. He says that these visionairies usually tries to manipulate the chess-board while forgetting that each piece has rules and principles of motion of its own. This criticism is backed by the complexity in Smith's descriptive views of morality -- he presents such a complex and ambivalent view of human happiness and Good that all the variables cannot be examined by one forceful actor initially.
Perhaps we need to separate the visions of Steve Jobs and Elon from those of Stalin. One produces something and lets markets and individuals decide to converge to an end point the latter forcibly tears down any human obstacles in his path.
The man of system . . . is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts, without any regard either to the great interests, or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it. He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it. If those two principles coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human society will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy and successful. If they are opposite or different, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at all times in the highest degree of disorder.