Summary
Machiavelli was born poor and received one of the best classical educations. This was when Florence was a republic and only 3000 people could vote. Machiavelli rises to prominence and then is tortured and politically exiled in the Medici's return. He writes in his villa and hopes to regain the favor of the Medici, although some view this work as one of satire.
The prince was written in a classic format that aimed to advise political leaders.
The stated goal is to instruct rulers how to get and maintain power. The key is to use virtue over letting fortune decide, being cunning and planning for everything. This is a very gendered idea as virtue is masculine while fortune is feminine. He even says that virtue needs to beat fortune into submission like man does a woman. This is perhaps why he appreciates fear (masculine) more than love (feminine).
He takes on a neo-Aristotelean notion of virtue in that the golden mean is somewhat relative to the individual and changes depending on the times.
Machiavelli is always preparing for some negative and heeding princes to do the same. Whether it is the general who always thinks about war in peace time, or even himself who constantly mentions stability and preserving power more than obtaining more power, these are individuals motivated not by the approaching drive of an ideal state but the avoidant drive against a negative state. It is illuminating when obtaining prestige or allies is a tactic to accomplish preservation and it is through this prioritization (stability over expansion) we can understand why Machiavelli does not give us a normative direction to strive towards: for Machiavelli the good is the absence of any bad.
This is the first book in the canon where politics has been separated from ethics. The reason is perhaps because ethics was made to pursue a notion of the "good" yet in Machiavelli's time the good was clear cut: don't lose stability.
On Agency and Fortune
Machiavelli held agency as the highest virtue because agency is what leads Man to conquer fate.
The Romans did, in fact, what all wise princes ought to do: not only must they be on their guard for actual political disorders, but also for potential ones; they must prevent the latter with all their diligence. When provided for in advance, these disorders can be cured; but if you wait until they are upon you, medicine is too late-the disease has become incurable.
On a state level the exemplars of agency were the Romans who had colonies, made strong neighbors weaker… they were preparing for trouble that might come in the future which is the best way to deal with problems.
Like all things in nature that are quick to sprout and grow, cannot have roots and branches fully enough developed so that the first spell of bad weather does not tear them up.
In the end it balances out, if someone was not ready for a position that landed in their lap due to chance they would not be able to master it. Same thing with business: no one who is at a high level position is there because of luck along. They will either be able to master it or not.
A prince cannot honorably satisfy the rich without harming others, but he can certainly satisfy the common people because their purpose is more honorable than that of the rich: the latter want to oppress, the former want only not to be oppressed.
There is a dimension of honor and virtue in his world view. But I believe that his dominant stance is he who controls power in the long run is able to morph what is virtue and vice.
A prince, therefore, ought to have no object, thought, or profession but war, its methods, and its discipline; that is the only art expected of one who governs…. A prince ought never let his thoughts stray from military training especially in peacetime.
He takes paranoia as a virtue as well. He always wants leaders to ask: “what should I be paranoid about?“
The way you can prepare for disaster is through physical activity and mental activity. “he ought to hunt constantly, and in so doing inure his body to hardships.” What is fascinating is why Machiavelli prescribes physical training: because it will hurt you. It’s almost a constant reminder of the dangers to come.
Regarding mental activity, the prince ought to read history and imitate great men: “So it is said that Alexander the Great imitated Achilles; Caesar, Alexander; Scipio, Cyrus….A wise prince ought to practice such methods as these and never remain idle during peacetime, but instead cleverly profit from peaceable periods so that they can prove valuable during times of adversity. Thus when Fortune changes, a wise prince may be prepared to resist her.”
Among the other reasons why authors have praised Philopoemen, the leader of the Achaeans, is that in time of peace he never thought about any thing but military strategy. When he was out in the country with his friends, he often stopped and asked them: What if the enemy were on that hill and we were here with our army, who would have the advantage? How could we attack them without breaking ranks? If we should want to retreat, how could we go about it? If they retreated, how would we go about pursuing them? And as they walked along, he pointed out all the contingencies that an army might encounter. He heeded their opinions, expressed his own, and supported it with reasons: so that, because of this constant reflection, when he was leading an army there could arise no unforeseen events for which he had no remedy.
Machiavelli compares fortune to a river which in an angry outburst inundates plains, uproots trees, and ruins buildings. The problem is that when the weather is calm men might not be able to take such measures as building embankments and dams.
It is a common human failing not to anticipate a storm when the weather is fine.
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Fortune shows her power in places where no virtu has been marshaled to resist her; she directs her onslaught to those places where embankments and dams have not been constructed to restrain her.
On Virtue
I think it may well be true that Fortune is the mistress of half of our actions, but that even so she leaves control of the other half-or nearly that much-to us.
The two key forces at war in Machiavelli is virtu and fortuna. The latter is the feminine energy of chaos and uncertainty the former is the male characteristic of steadfastness. There is a clear gendered distinction between these two forces.
Achilles and many other ancient princes were brought up by the centaur Chiron, who was to nurture and instruct them. Having a teacher half animal and half man can only mean that a prince must know how to use both natures: he who only has one is not likely to survive.
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Since the lion is powerless against snares and the fox is powerless against wolves, one must be a fox to recognize snares and a lion to frighten away wolves…. Hence a prudent ruler cannot and should not respect his word, when such respect works to his disadvantage and when the reasons for which he made his promise no longer exist. If all men were good, this precept would be invalid; but since they are bad and do not respect their own word, you need not respect your word either.
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Yet a prince's mind should be so enlightened that when you do not need to have these qualities, you have the knowledge and the ability to become the opposite. A prince, and particularly a new prince, must understand that he is unable to respect all those qualities for which men are considered good. For to maintain his rule, he is frequently obliged to behave in opposition to good faith, to charity, to humanity, and to religion. Thus he needs a flexible mind, altering as the winds of Fortune and changes in affairs' require.
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As I said before, he does not deviate from the good, when that is possible; but he knows how to do evil when necessary.
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When there is no court to appeal to, people judge all men's actions, and particularly those of a prince, by the final outcome.
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The ephemeral nature of the good also depends upon the conditions of the times.
On Cruelty
It all depends on the good or bad uses of ruthless measures… a ruthless measure can be termed good, if it results the need for security. The "bad" use occurs when the ruthless measures, though initially few, increase rather than diminish with time. Men who follow the former method can remedy their condition with respect to God and men-as did Agathocles. Men who follow other methods cannot possibly retain their position.
Hence it is to be noted that when seizing power a conqueror ought to examine closely all the damage he must inflict, and inflict it all at once so that he is not obliged to repeat it daily; because by not repeating it, he can reassure men and win them over to his side with the favors he distributes. Whoever acts otherwise, out of either timidity or bad advice, always needs to carry a sword in his hand; he can never count on his subjects, who will never feel secure with him because of their recent and continual abuses. Abuses ought to be inflicted all at once-the shorter savored, the less resented; favors ought to be distributed gradually be better savored.
On Human Nature
In unsettled periods there will always be a dearth of men whom he can trust. Such a prince, therefore, cannot count on what he observes in peaceful times, when the citizens need the state, because then everybody comes running, makes promises, and would die willingly for him-when such death is remote. But in bad times, when the state needs the citizens, few supporters are to be found. Especially since this test can be performed only once, it is all the more dangerous. Therefore an experienced prince ought to contrive methods to force his citizens to need both his government and himself whatever the circumstances: then they will always be loyal to him….
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For a man who wants to practice goodness in all situations is inevitably destroyed, among so many men who are not good. Hence a prince who wishes to retain his power must learn not to be good, and to use, or not to use, that ability according to necessity.
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“Ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceiver.” “They shun danger and are greedy for profit; while you treat them well, they are yours. They would shed their blood for you … but when you are in danger they turn against you.”
Feared, Loved, and not Hated
The answer is that a prince would like to be both. But since it is difficult to reconcile these two, it is much safer to be feared than loved-if the one must cede to the other. For it can be said about men in general that they are ungrateful, fickle, dissembling, hypocritical ,a cowardly, and greedy. As long as you treat them well, they are all yours…
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Any prince who relies on their word alone, without any other precaution, is ruined…
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A prince should make himself feared in such a way that, if he does not gain love, he does avoid hatred: being feared and not being hated are sentiments that readily go together. This situation will always obtain when the prince keeps his hands off the property of his subjects and citizens-and from their women. Yet if he does need to take someone's life, let him take it when there is suitable justification and evident reason. But above all he should restrain himself from other people's property: men are quicker to forget the death of a father than the loss of an inheritance.
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A prince ought to fear two things: one is domestic concerns and another is foreign concerns. For the latter he can protect himself with good armies and good allies (if he has good armies he always has good allies)… domestic affairs will always be stable when foreign relations are.
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One of the most potent remedies a prince has against conspiracies is not being hated by the people at large. when the conspirator believes he might cause the people trouble, he has not the courage to undertake such a project because the obstacles conspirators face are countless.
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From that we can deduce another important idea: a prince must delegate to others those measures which entail blame, to himself those which cause pleasure. Once again I conclude that a prince ought to respect the nobility, but not make himself hated by the people.
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Never be the bearer of bad news. A way to not be hated is to have another entity do your dirty work for you.
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Even if you possess fortresses, they will not save you if the people hate you; once the people have taken up arms, foreign intervention can only help them.
On Borgia
I know of no better precepts to give a new prince than the example of Cesare's actions.
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And since this point deserves to be known and imitated by others, I do not want to omit it. Once the duke had occupied the Romagna, he found it under the control of ineffective rulers who were 150 quicker to extort their subjects than to govern them; these rulers gave their subjects cause for discord, not harmony, so that the entire region was rife with thieving, brawling, and all other sorts of lawlessness. The duke decided that he must of necessity 155 give the Romagna good government if he desired to pacify it and make it obey his sovereign power. Hence he placed in control Ramiro de Lorqua-a ruthless, efficient man, to whom he gave absolute power. Ramiro quickly pacified and unified the 160 Romagna, thereby acquiring enormous prestige. The duke later deemed such immoderate power to be unnecessary, fearing that it might become intol- erable. In the heart of the region he established a circuit court for civil suits with an outstanding 165 judge presiding; each city was represented by its own lawyer. Since he realized that past severities had generated some hatred against Ramiro, and since he wanted to purge the minds of those people and win them entirely over to his side, he decided 170 to show that if there had been any ruthlessness, it had proceeded not from him but from the harsh actions of his minister. So, once he got the opportunity, he had Ramiro's body laid out one morning in two pieces on the public square at Cesena with 175 a block of wood and a bloody sword beside it. The brutality of this spectacle left those people simultaneously gratified and terrified.
But it’s important to remember that even Machiavelli’s example par excellence suffered at the hands of fortune:
He thought of four plans to protect himself: first, wiping out all the 200 families of those lords he had dispossessed so as to deprive the pope of that opportunity; second, winning over to his side all the Roman nobility, as I have said, so as to have their help in checking the pope; third, converting the College of Cardinals to 205 his own ends as much as possible; and fourth, acquiring so much power before Alexander died that Cesare might resist an initial attack on his own. Before Alexander's death he had implemented three of these four plans, and the fourth was almost 210 fulfilled: he had murdered as many of the dispossessed lords as he could reach-and very few es- caped; he had won over the Roman nobility to his side; he had the largest faction in the College of Cardinals; and, as for increasing his power, he had 215 planned to become the ruler of Tuscany-he already possessed Perugia and Piombino and had become the protector of Pisa.
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If he had been in good health when Alexander died, everything would have been easy for him. And on the day Julius II was made pope, he himself told me that he had considered what might happen when his father died and that he had found a remedy for everything, except he had never considered that when his father was about to die he too would be close to death.
Miscellaneous:
He analyzes the church state in a completely secular/realist way saying how it is the most efficient of all states in terms of amassing power. He clearly believes that ideology is more powerful than any army.
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Diving people into fortresses and factions to better maintain control doesn’t do anyone any good. Since you just lose it once an enemy comes…. Such policies, moreover, are indicative of weakness in the prince: a vigorous princedom never allows itself such divisiveness.
Only being able to maintain a weak state is a sign of weakness of the ruler.
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Don’t be indebted to others. Don’t use auxiliary forces. They are worse than mercenary forces: the former will rule over you and always have his ruler’s best incentives in mind while the latter are doing it only for money. Also don’t partner with people much stronger than you. They will take everything.
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Nothing gives a prince greater prestige than embarking upon great enterprises and giving exceptional proof of his abilities.
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Prince should also indicate his admiration of virtu by patronizing men with virtu and honoring excellent craftsmen.
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For there is no way to ward off flattery except to convince men that you are not offended by their telling you the truth; on the other hand, when everyone can tell you the truth you lose respect.
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Therefore, a wise prince ought to adopt a third method: choosing wise men for his government. To these wise men only ought a prince give 15 full authority to speak the truth to him-and only on those matters he asks about, nothing else. But he ought to query them about everything and listen to their opinions; later he should make up his own mind at his leisure. The attitude should be that the more freely one speaks, the more acceptable he will be….