Nichomachean Ethics
My preferred way of engaging with books is reconstruction. These notes were created during my reading process to aid my own understanding and not written for the purpose of instruction. With that said, I’ve decided to share these unedited notes on the off chance they are helpful to other readers.
The Nichomachean Ethics is an inquiry into the Good life.
Aristotle observes that we act for means and ends, but more often than not, ends only appear to be means to further ends (purchasing a car may be the end of driving to the dealership, but it itself is a means to the ends of transportation). He wants to find out what is the final end. This final end must be not desired for anything else, desirable for itself, and all other goods must be desired for it.
This end is Eudemonia or human flourishing. It is essentially virtuous activity from virtuous disposition. Plato's idealism and Aristotle's pragmatism is in stark contrast here. The former defines justice, what we normally consider to be a set of guidelines for action, as a state, while the latter defines flourishing, which we commonly think as a state of being, as actions.
Human good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete. But we must add ‘in a complete life’. For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.
Eudemonia is not binary. Due to the variety and hierarchy of virtues, there are different strands and degrees of Eudemonia. This will be important in his discussion of the best life. Eudemonia is not instantaneous either. It is not just about performing one virtuous act but acting virtuously over and over again as to cultivate a virtuous disposition.
Eudemonia may only be dependent on virtue but that in turn requires certain external conditions to be present: friends, wealth, power, and even, attractiveness. "For the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition." The reason for this dependency is twofold. Aristotle is concerned that a person without such external conditions 1. will have diminished capacity and potential to actualize, and therefore, further cultivate virtue 2. will stop being virtuous altogether because the circumstance cannot sustain it. We see echoes of Nietzsche's comment that only knights can love: only the powerful can afford to be good in the long run.
Ethical Virtues
Aristotle split virtues into intellectual virtue -- excellence of the mind -- as well as ethical virtue -- excellence in character. The former interacts with reason directly while the latter can be put under the domain of reason. These two sets are mutually dependent: intellectual virtues inform ethical virtues, while ethical virtues are a basis for obtaining intellectual virtues.
Much like the Buddhist concept of compassion, ethical virtues are dispositions that can be cultivated through repetition. We are born with capacities for these virtues and may learn about them theoretically but, also like Buddhism, merely having the intellectual knowledge is not enough. It is up to the individual to transform these into actualities: virtuous action leads to virtuous disposition which makes it easier for furthered virtuous action.
Each virtue is between two vices: one extreme and one a deficiency. Thus, each virtue is a golden mean. E.g. courage is the mean between the two extremes of rashness and cowardness.
The specific mean for a virtue is dependent upon the specific circumstance. In fact, discussions of ethics in general, or so Aristotle argues, can only be systematized and taxonomized so far before one falls to arbitrariness: "Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts." Buddhism has a similar idea about how ethics escapes rigid systematicity, that is why there are no universal ethical laws. Ethical behavior is conveyed through stories that can capture more complexity, just as how imitating models plays a bigger role in ethical education than systemization in Aristotle.
We need to beware of false virtues. Take courage for example, one can be outwardly courageous in order to win approval, because they have been compelled by rulers, because they have past experience, because they are rash and spirited, or because they are ignorant of the dangers. None of these are true virtuous. The truly courageous is characterized by a "concern for the fine". They will feel fear, but not be paralyzed by it; they take sacrifice seriously, but are no less compelled to sacrifice if necessary.
Intellectual Virtues
Aristotle splits the virtues of the mind into theoretical wisdom, concerning abstraction and conceptual understanding, and practical wisdom, concerning worldly knowledge and practical wisdom.
Practical wisdom supports our navigation of the world, the cultivation of theoretical wisdom and ethical virtues. But theoretical wisdom is, in some ways, the best of all virtues.
Aristotle discusses three lives: a life devoted to pleasure, to politics, and to contemplation. After quickly dismissing the first on charges of vulgarity, he affirms the political life as a great avenue to exercise ethical virtue and practical wisdom. But he believes that the life of a politician is not desirable when compared to the life of the philosopher. The first reason he gives is that the political life is more dependent: it requires more external circumstances such as power and even turmoil for one to practice the political virtues whereas the philosopher can contemplate whenever. The second reason he gives is that the contemplative life is closer to the Gods who spend all of eternity thinking. The last reason is because our faculty of reason is something unique to humans and therefore our highest actualization must prioritize it in some way. Aristotle viewed every object as having a teleology that is expressed through its unique functionality. This teleology contains within itself, standards for measurement.
Even though theoretical wisdom is held at highest regard, he does not reject the importance of practical wisdom or ethical virtues for the philosopher-to-be. Much like how externality support virtues, the full development of the latter two also acts as a ground for theoretical wisdom.
On Pleasure
Pleasures are a necessary component to the Good life but are by no means a priority.
The first function they serve is to act as compasses. They are indicators of virtue but, by themselves, are quite fallible. The second function is to serve as motivation on our pursuit of virtue. Thus it is important to find pleasure in the right things, namely virtuous activity.
The dangers with pleasure is that they can be so intense that it hinders one's ability to seek virtue. Also many pleasure-seeking behavior is actually just a distraction from deficiencies in character.
On Pride
Aristotle lists out some primary ethical virtues, but his discussion of pride is quite interesting, especially for readers heavily influenced by Christian morality. He calls pride "crown of the virtues" which is a stark contrast to the latter Augustine who views pride as a root cause of sin.
At first glance we are led to conclude that what Aristotle terms pride is actually more moderate: it is being great and recognizing one's greatness:
Now the man is thought to be proud who thinks himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them; for he who does so beyond his deserts is a fool, but no virtuous man is foolish or silly…The proud man, then, is an extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but a mean in respect of the rightness of them; for he claims what is accordance with his merits, while the others go to excess or fall short.
"Pride, then, seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it is not found without them." Pride is the crown of virtues in the sense that it is what one gets when one has mastered all of them, it is not the best of all virtues but rather a signifier that one has mastered all virtues. It would seem as if the Christian-Aristotelean conflict is resolved, their disagreement on pride seems to be one on definition.
But on a closer reading, the proud man does display the disdain we normally attribute to arrogance:
"But honour from casual people and on trifling grounds he will utterly despise, since it is not this that he deserves, and dishonour too, since in his case it cannot be just … For the proud man despises justly (since he thinks truly), but the many do so at random."
While there probably is a slight change in definition between the two, it is clear that what was considered a virtue in Athens became a vice in Jerusalem. It is important what a culture thinks about pride. As this quote shows, it informs much about their thinking about why people deserve things: “Now the proud man, since he deserves most, must be good in the highest degree; for the better man always deserves more, and the best man most."
On Justice
Justice is also a virtue and it has two parts. The first part is universal justice -- the disposition to follow and abide by laws from an authority. The second part is particular justice -- the disposition to distribute things fairly. This is then broken down into distributive justice "who deserves what?" and corrective justice "How ought one be repayed/punished?"
On Friendship
Aristotle believes that friendships can be based off of pleasure, utility, or respect for another's virtue.
Since true friendships are marked by a desire for the good of one's friend for the friend's sake, the first two types of friendships barely can be labelled as such. They is little trust between friends and the relationship becomes much less sustainable and easy to disintegrate as a result.
True friends should live together because they grow together in virtue. As a result, Aristotle thinks that we can only have so many of the true friends.
Does it not follow, then, that, as for lovers the sight of the beloved is the thing they love most, and they prefer this sense to the others because on it love depends most for its being and for its origin, so for friends the most desirable thing is living together? For friendship is a partnership, and as a man is to himself, so is he to his friend; now in his own case the consciousness of his being is desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness of his friend's being, and the activity of this consciousness is produced when they live together, so that it is natural that they aim at this. And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends; and so some drink together, others dice together, others join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in the study of philosophy, each class spending their days together in whatever they love most in life; for since they wish to live with their friends, they do and share in those things which give them the sense of living together. Thus the friendship of bad men turns out an evil thing (for because of their instability they unite in bad pursuits, and besides they become evil by becoming like each other), while the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mould of the characteristics they approve--whence the saying 'noble deeds from noble men'.
"Good for himself, and makes an equal return in goodwill and in pleasantness; for friendship is said to be equality, and both of these are found most in the friendship of the good." Another requisite for true friendship Aristotle believes to be equality. If the relationship isn't equal then pleasure or utility comes into play at the foreground for one of the participants. Furthermore if the two aren't equal then they wouldn’t be able to spend enough time together to cultivate the solid type of friendship. Aristotle says that this is why even good people don't wish for the very best thing to happen to their friends—like becoming a god. Deification would probably end the friendship:
This becomes clear if there is a great interval in respect of virtue or vice or wealth or anything else between the parties; for then they are no longer friends, and do not even expect to be so. And this is most manifest in the case of the gods; for they surpass us most decisively in all good things. But it is clear also in the case of kings; for with them, too, men who are much their inferiors do not expect to be friends; nor do men of no account expect to be friends with the best or wisest men. In such cases it is not possible to define exactly up to what point friends can remain friends; for much can be taken away and friendship remain, but when one party is removed to a great distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases. This is in fact the origin of the question whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest goods, e.g. that of being gods; since in that case their friends will no longer be friends to them, and therefore will not be good things for them (for friends are good things). The answer is that if we were right in saying that friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his friend must remain the sort of being he is, whatever that may be; therefore it is for him only so long as he remains a man that he will wish the greatest goods. But perhaps not all the greatest goods; for it is for himself most of all that each man wishes what is good.
On Politics
Even though the best life is the contemplative one, it would be impossible to achieve if none chose the political life. Humans can't flourish unless they live in the right communities, imitate the right models, learn good habits at an early age, and thus, Aristotle sets up the importance of his Politics.